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U.S. Immigration Reform, Homeland Security,
and Global Economic Competitiveness
in the Aftermath of the September 11, 2001
Terrorist Attacks
James H. Johnson, Jr.*
I. Introduction
After nearly a half-century .of liberal immigration
policymaking, the U.S. government has implemented a series of
"get tough" reforms in recent years, including the USA Patriot Act
of 2001,' which are designed to reduce the nation's risk of
exposure to future acts of terrorism.2 Research indicates that most
of the amendments to our immigration policy over the past fifty
years were designed to facilitate commerce, spread democracy,
and promote knowledge and international understanding,
especially by forging ties with future leaders abroad through
international education programs.' But the most recent policy
* William Rand Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Professor, Department of Management,
Kenan-Flagler Business School, Departments of Sociology and Public Policy, College of
Arts and Sciences, and Director, Urban Investment Strategies Center, Kenan Institute of
Private Enterprise, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. Ph.D., 1980, Michigan State University; M.S., 1977, University of
Wisconsin at Madison; B.S., 1975, North Carolina Central University.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.); see infra text accompanying notes 141-42. This Act
is also known as the Antiterrorism Act.
2 Joe Cantlupe, U.S. Emphasis Now: Get Tough at Border, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Sept. 24, 2001, at A7, 2001 WL 27290828; Greg Miller & Nick Anderson, Mood
Swiftly Changes on Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at A12, available at 2001
WL 2518949; Michael J. Wildes, Security Hinges on Tougher Immigration Laws,
RECORD (N.J.), Sept. 23, 2001, at 04, 2001 WL 5269536; Ira Glasser, Scapegoating
Immigrants-Again, VISIONS OF LIBERTY (Nov. 17, 1996), at http://www.aclu.org/
library/visionl7.html (VISIONS OF LIBERTY is an online column written by Ira Glasser,
the Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
3 Diana Jean Schemo & Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: Immigration; Suspects
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reforms, implemented in the aftermath of the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, reflect a dramatic shift in attitude toward
immigration.4
By imposing substantial constraints on the movement of
people (as well as capital, goods, and services) into and out of the
United States, the most recent reforms have the potential to
severely constrain future economic growth and prosperity,
domestically and internationally. Given this very real potential,
the federal government needs to re-evaluate its approach to
homeland defense, since research confirms that agility and
flexibility-in terms of both the location and organization of
economic activities-will continue to be the key drivers of
economic competitiveness in the highly integrated world
economy.6
In this essay, I critically evaluate the immigration reforms
implemented to combat terrorism and heighten homeland
security.7  After identifying the weakness inherent in these
reforms,8 I propose an alternative strategy that will allow the
United States to improve homeland defense without significantly
encumbering the international flow of capital, people, goods, and
services.9
in Hijackings Exploited Loopholes in Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at
Al.
4 Terrorism and Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at A26.
5 See David Carr, The Futility of "Homeland Defense," ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.
2002, at 53, 54-55.
6 Dennis Rondinelli, James H. Johnson, Jr. & John D. Kasarda, The Changing
Forces of Urban Economic Development: Globalization and City Competitiveness in the
21st Century, 3 CITYSCAPE 71, 71 (1998); Douglas D. Abbey et al., The Need for Speed:
Impact on Supply Chain Real Estate, URBAN LAND, Jan. 2001, at 1, available at
http://www.amb.com/InformationCenter/WhitePaper.pdf (URBAN LAND is a monthly
magazine published by the Urban Land Institute, an organization devoted to researching
and analyzing long-term urban growth patterns as well as conducting inquiries into what
constitutes sound real estate development practices) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation); Jon E. Hilsenrath,
Globalization Persists In Precarious New Age, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2001, at Al.
7 See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 144-76 and accompanying text
9 See infra notes 177-213 and accompanying text.
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A core component of the proposed strategy requires the United
States to take a leadership role in addressing the structural,
environmental, and social justice issues that underlie the anti-
globalization movement. ° I argue that through the global alliance
forged in the aftermath of the September 11 th attacks to combat
terrorism on a worldwide scale, the United States has a unique
opportunity to facilitate the development of a more sustainable
model of globalization, one that minimizes the threat of terrorism
by creating a more inclusive capitalism for the world's four billion
acutely poor people."
To set the context for this research, I begin with a brief
overview of U.S. immigration policymaking over the past forty
years. I highlight the policy impacts on the composition and
geographic distribution of the U.S. population as well as the
economic health of the nation during this period of relatively
liberal attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. 3 I also
identify the major loopholes in our immigration policy, which
were exploited by the terrorists involved in the September l1th
attacks on our nation. 4 It is against the backdrop of this essential
information that the recent reforms are critically evaluated.
10 John Micklethwait & Adrian Woolridge, Globalism Under Siege, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 9, 2001, at A14; Jeff Faux, A Deal Built on Sand, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, at
A22, available at http://www.prospect.org/printlV13/l/faux-j.html; Merrill Goozner,
Medicine as a Luxury, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, at A7, available at
http://www.prospect.orglprintlV13/1/goozner-m.html; Mark Weisbrot, The Mirage of
Progress, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, at A10, available at http://www.prospect.org/
print/Vl3/l/weisbrot-m.html; Christian E. Weller & Adam Hersh, Free Markets and
Poverty, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, at A13, available at http://www.prospect.org/
print/ 13/1/weller-c.html.
11 Christopher A. Bartlett et al., Below the Bottom Line, ACROSS BOARD, Jan.-Feb.
2002, at 20; C.K. Prahalad & Stuart L. Hart, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid,
STRATEGY & Bus., Jan. 14, 2002, at 1, 1-2, available at http://www.strategy-
business.com/media/pdf/02106.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
12 See infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 30-67 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 68-140 and accompanying text.
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II. Background and Context
A. Post-1960 Immigration Policymaking: A General
Overview
For much of the second half of the twentieth century, the
United States maintained a liberal attitude toward immigration. 5
During this period, U.S. immigration policy was strongly
influenced by two groups of lobbyists: market-oriented
expansionists on the political right and rights-oriented
expansionists on the political left.16 Elsewhere I have referred to
these two groups as strange bedfellows because both have
advocated an open-door immigration policy, but for radically
different reasons. 7
The market-oriented expansionists were mainly business
people whose support for an open-door immigration policy was
based on their need for both skilled and unskilled labor as well as
their desire to ease the way for commerce in an increasingly
integrated world economy.18 The rights-oriented expansionists, on
the other hand, were primarily human rights advocates and
members of ethnic minority groups, whose advocacy for an open-
door immigration policy was based on their desire to create a safe
haven for powerless immigrant groups, including refugees and
asylum seekers-individuals fleeing political and religious
persecution. 19
These two groups began to strongly influence immigration
reform policymaking in the mid-1960s, coincident with the civil
15 Douglas S. Massey, Why Does Immigration Occur?: A Theoretical Synthesis, in
THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 34-52
(Charles Hirschman et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
16 Peter Andreas, Border Troubles: Free Trade, Immigration and Cheap Labour,
24 ECOLOGIST 230, 232 (1994); Daniel J. Tichenor, Immigration and Political
Community in the United States, 4 RESPONSIVE CMTY. 16, 18 (1994); see Robert Malloy
& Mark Kirkorian, Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965
Immigration Act, 23 IMMIGR. REv. 1, 3-4 (1995).
17 James H. Johnson, Jr., et al., Immigration Reform and the Browning of America:
Tensions, Conflicts and Community Instability in Metropolitan Los Angeles, 31 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 1055, 1057 (1997).
18 Tichenor, supra note 16, at 18.
19 Id.
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rights movement, when laws were implemented to end racial
discrimination in all walks of American life. For much of the first
half of the twentieth century, U.S. immigration policy focused
primarily on maintaining the nation's existing racial and ethnic
mix, which favored immigrants from Northern and Western
Europe. 20  But the Hart-Cellar Act of 196521 eliminated the
discriminatory provisions inherent in U.S. immigration law, which
had prohibited individuals and families from. other parts of the
world, especially the Asian Pacific Triangle Region, from entering
the United States.22 This act, along with more recent amendments,
especially the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198623 and
the Immigration Act of 1990,24 ushered in dramatic changes in the
origin, size, and composition of the legal immigration streams into
the United States.
In 1986, for example, the market-oriented expansionists were
successful in garnering political support for increases in the
number of employer-sponsored and skilled-worker visas as well as
visas for unskilled labor for the agricultural, garment, and hotel
sectors of the U.S. economy.25  In 1990, they were again
successful in getting the cap raised on legal immigration by
securing increases in the number of employer-sponsored and
skilled-worker visas.26
In 1986, the rights-oriented expansionists were able to secure a
generous amnesty program for illegal immigrants.27  Their
advocacy also led to the establishment of a civil rights agency
charged with combating job discrimination against aliens; new
protections for temporary farm workers; a generous allocation of
family reunification visas; and removal of many of the ideological
20 Glasser, supra note 2.
21 The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1152 (2001)).
22 Massey, supra note 15, at 34.
23 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C.,
and 42 U.S.C.).
24 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (2001)).
25 Tichenor, supra note 16, at 18.
26 Id.
27 Id.; Johnson, Jr., et al., supra note 17, at 1057.
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and sexual orientation restrictions.28 In 1990, they managed to
secure stays of deportation for family members of individuals
legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986.29
*ust~am, b NT & OC~eanISC~l
C Jame$ H JOhnSOn, J, lOS5. 2001
Figure 1. U.S. Department of Justice, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 122 (2000),
available at http://www.ins.usdog.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/
FY99Yearbook.pdf
B. Size and Composition of Immigrant Streams
What impact did these reforms have on immigrant flows into
the United States? Between 1920 and 1961, legal immigration to
28 Tichenor, supra note 16, at 18.
29 Id. at 17.
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the United States averaged about 206,000 per year, with major
flows originating in Northern and Western Europe.3" Since the
passage of the Hart-Cellar Act in 1965, the volume of immigration
has increased sharply, averaging 561,000 annually between the
1960s and the early 1990s.31 Owing to the aforementioned
changes in immigration policy, the average number of entries
increased to 800,654 annually between 1993 and 1998.32 In
contrast to the pre-1965 period, the dominant flows now originate
in the Asian Pacific Triangle Region, as Figure One illustrates.
Table 1: The Numbers
Legal Immigrants:
1920-61: 206,000 annually
1961-92: 561,000 annually
1993-98: 800,654 annually
Refugees, Parolees, Asylees:
1961-93: 2.1 million (65,000 annually)
1994-98: 428,361 (85,672 annually)
Illegal Immigrants:
300,000 to 400,000 annually over the past two decades
Three million granted amnesty in 1986
After 1986 reforms, 2.7 million illegal immigrants remained in U.S.
October 1996: INS estimated that there were 5 million illegal
immigrants in the U.S.
April 2001: Illegal population ranges from 7.1 to 9 million.
Source: U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 122 (2000), available at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphcs/aboutins/statistics/FY99Yearbook.pdf
Consistent with our liberal attitude toward immigration,
especially the advocacy of the rights-oriented expansionists, the
United States has also been a haven for individuals and families
fleeing persecution of one form or another. As shown by Table
One, which was created from statistics by the Immigration and
30 See Table One and Figure One, respectively.
31 See Table One.
32 See Table One.
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Naturalization Service (INS), between 1961 and 1992, 2.1 million
refugees, parolees, and asylees were allowed to settle in the United
States, an average of about 65,000 annually. Between 1994 and
1998, 428,361 people were admitted; an average of 85,672
annually.
In addition to legal immigrants, refugees, parolees, and
asylum-seekers, the United States has also traditionally had an
open-door policy for a category of individuals referred to as
"nonimmigrants." These are individuals who are admitted to the
country on a temporary basis for a specific purpose for a specified
period of time. More than fifty different classes of people are
allowed to enter the United States as nonimmigrants, but the most
common classes are tourists and temporary visitors for business.33
Other noteworthy classes include exchange visitors, temporary
workers, and international students. Immigration law requires that
these individuals leave the country after the terms and conditions
Table 2: Nonimmigrants Admitted to the United States
Selected Years, 1981-1999
Year All Classes Exchange Visitors* Academic and
(row percentage) Vocational Students
1981 11,756,903 108,203 (1%) 271,861 (2%)
1985 9,539,880 141,213 (1%) 285,496 (3%)
1990 17,574,055 214,644 (1%) 355,207 (2%)
1995 22,640,540 241,364 (1%) 395,480 (2%)
1996 24,842,503 256,725 (1%) 459,388 (2%)
1998 30,174,627 292,730 (1%) 598,520 (2%)
1999 31,446,054 319,360 (1%) 603,787 (2%)
* Includes spouses and children of exchange visitors and students.
Source: U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1999), available at
http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/FY99Yearbook.pdf.
under which they were allowed to enter the United States have
expired.3 4 However, this provision was rarely enforced prior to the
33 John Ritter, Crackdown on Visas May Have Limited Effect, USA TODAY, Oct.
23, 2001, at 10A.
34 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERV. 122 (2000), available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/
aboutins/statistics/FY99Yearbook.pdf.
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September 11 th attacks.35
Nonimmigrants Arriving in United States
by Country of Citizenship, 1999
(Issuance of Non-resident visas, fiscal year 1999)
Table Two provides statistics on the number of nonimmigrants
admitted to the United States for selected years between 1981 and
1999. Because of their enormous contributions to the U.S.
economy, the number of noninnigrants allowed to enter the
country increased sharply during the last twenty years, from 11.7
million in 1981 to 31.5 million in 1999.
Figure Two depicts countries of citizenship for nonimmigrants
arriving in the United States in 1999. This data illustrates the
attractiveness of the United States in the international marketplace.
Of the 31.5 million admitted in 1999, 38% were citizens of
35 Patrick J. McDonnell & Russell Carollo, An Easy Entry for Attackers;
Immigration Flaws Gamer Attention as Authorities Track the Sept. 11 Hijackers'
Movements Through the United States, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at Al.
Num0ber ofvim Ioued cOH.
EI S
=100.O0 Gu-
LII 900.0 0 496.
Chin data Irick.n Toten and Hong Kong
Sorne. U.S. Deportnment of StWte, aureau Of Consuar AaImoo, Vim Office
CJH. Joh-oO. Jr. 2001
Figure 2. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, VISA OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE.
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European countries, 25% were citizens of Mexico and other Latin
American countries, and 23% were citizens of Asian countries
(mainly Japan, Korea, China, and India).
Finally, the most controversial aspect of post-1965
immigration policymaking pertains to the number of foreigners
who have been able to enter the United States illegally. The
undocumented immigrant problem, discussed below, stems from
the lax border controls and law enforcement procedures that have
undergirded our open-door immigration policy since 1965.
Suffice it to note here that the most recent estimates place the
number of undocumented aliens residing in the United States
between 7.1 million and 9 million.36 Research indicates that most
of these individuals entered the country in search of jobs and an
improved quality of life.37
C. Demographic Impacts
Early results from the 2000 Census demonstrate the
cumulative effects of nearly a half-century of liberal immigration
policymaking on the U.S. population.
Table 3: Net Population Change Attributable to Non-White
Population Growth, April 1, 1990 to April 1, 2000
Area 2000 Net Change Percentage Net
Population 1990-2000 Change Due to Non-
White Pop. Growth
United States 281,421,906 32,712,033 65%
Northeast 53,594,378 2,785,149 100%
Midwest 64,392,776 4,724,144 62%
South 100,236,820 14,790,890 52%
West 63,197,932 10,411,850 69%
North Carolina 8,049,313 1,420,676 52%
Source: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS 2000 REDISTRICTING PLAN (P.L. 94-
171), SUMMARY FILEAND U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1990 CENSUS.
36 See Table One.
37 Artistide R. Zolberg, From Invitation to Introduction: U.S. Foreign Policy and
Immigration Since 1945, in THREATENED PEOPLES, THREATENED BORDERS: WORLD
MIGRATION AND U.S. POLICY 156 (Michael S. Teitelbaum & Myron Welner eds., 1995).
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As Table Three shows, the U.S. population grew by 32.7 million
(or 13.2%) during the 1990s. Non-white ethnic minorities, or
people of color-Asians, , Blacks, .Hispanics, and Native
Americans-many of whom arrived from abroad, were
responsible for the bulk of the net growth.38
Percent Change in Total Population
from 1990 to 2000 by State
State size shown is proportional to rate
NeVada
62.51/
'NorthCarolina
20.6%
The 0ic1 oIf ,,i hed neg.ave oth e1t 641
US. t55 grmfh ,ft 13. f5%
Percent Change in Non-White Population
from 1990 to 2000 by State
State size shown is proportional to rate
% W-
Hawaii El -0
14.5% ......Arizona N-............._+ "
190% [ l,0r+=.,.1)
The ,1. 4 of 0homibi h ad n.gal 47 1 o5 2
U .S -hf 9-Ah 4Z 471 % aR 4t43b/flVJ1
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Figure 3. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 122 (2000), available at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/FY99Yearbook.pdf.
38 See Table Three.
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Nationally, they accounted for 65% of the net growth. Regionally,
people of color were responsible for all (100%) of the net
population growth in the Northeast, 62% in the Midwest, 52% in
the South, and 69% in the West. As Figure Three shows, non-
white population growth during the 1990s dramatically changed
the demographic landscape of the United States.
How will these numbers affect the future racial and ethnic mix
of the U.S. population? Because the non-white population is much
younger and has. a much higher fertility rate than the non-Hispanic
white population,39 most population projections suggest that the
non-white population will continue to outpace both total and non-
Hispanic white population growth, at least until the year 2050.40
Table 4: America's Color Adjustment
Race/Ethnicity 1995 2050
White 73.6 52.8
Black 12.0 13.5
Hispanic 10.2 24.5
Asian 3.3 8.2
American Indian 0.7 0.9
Source: Ramon G. McLeod, U.S. Population Expected to Be Half Minorities by
2050. S.F. CHRON.. Mar. 14. 1996. at A3.
As Table Four shows, this will result in a major color
adjustment in America's population. The non-Hispanic white
share of the total population is projected to decrease from 73.6%
in 1995 to 52.8% in 2050, whereas Black, Hispanic, Asian, and
American Indian shares of the total population are projected to
increase from 12.0%, 10.2%, 3.3%, and 0.7% in 1995 to 13.5%,
24.5%, 8.2%, and 0.9% in 2050, respectively. This projected shift
in the racial and ethnic mix of the U.S. population has been
39 AMARA BACHA & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, P20-
543RV, CURRENT POPULATION REP. 3 (2001); Johnson, Jr., et al., supra note 17, at 1055.
40 Ramon G. McLeod, U.S. Population Expected to Be Half Minorities by 2050,
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14, 1996, at A3. For example, the Census Bureau, using 1988
statistics as a basis for estimating the U.S. population in 2050, projected a fifty percent
increase in the total population. JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY, U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, P25-1092, POPULATION PROJECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES By AGE, SEX,
RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1992-2050, at vii (1992). However, due to its lower
fertility rate, the non-Hispanic white population was projected to increase only twenty-
nine percent over this period. Id. at xviii. By contrast, the Black, Native American,
Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific Islander populations were projected to increase at much
higher rates-by 94%, 109%, 238%, and 412%, respectively. Id. at xix.
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Table 5: Population by Race & Hispanic Origin
for the United States (2000)
Race and Hispanic or Latino Number Percentage of
Total
Total Population 281,421,906 100
One Race 274,595,678 97.6
White 211,460,626 75.1
Black or African American 34,658,190 12.3
American Indian and Alaskan 2,475,986 0.9
Native
Asian 10,242,998 3.6
Native Hawaiian and 398,835 0.1
Other Pacific Islanders
Some Other Race 15,359,073 5.5
Two or More Races 6,826,228 2.4
Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 35,305,818 1. 5
Source: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS 2000 REDISTRICTING PLAN (P.L. 94-
171), SUMMARY FILE, TBLS. PLI, PL2.
referred to elsewhere as the "browning" of America.'"
Much of the recent net growth in the U.S. population is
attributable to the influx of Hispanics from Mexico and other parts
of Latin America. For example, Table Five above shows that
according to the 2000 Census, Hispanics have replaced African-
Americans as the nation's largest minority group. In 2000,
Hispanics accounted for 12.5% of the U.S. population, while
African Americans accounted for 12.3%. If the Census Bureau
had an accurate count of the undocumented immigrant population,
the Hispanic share would probably be even greater.
D. Geographic Impacts
Not only has the Hispanic population grown dramatically in
both absolute and relative terms, members of the group have
begun to redistribute themselves geographically within the United
States.42 Historically, Hispanics were concentrated in the U.S.
41 Johnson, Jr., et al., supra note 17, at 1095; James H. Johnson, Jr., Karen D.
Johnson-Webb & Walter C. Farrell, Jr., Newly Emerging Hispanic Communities in the
United States: A Spatial Analysis of Settlement Patterns, In-Migration Fields, and Social
Receptivity, in IMMIGRATION AND OPPORTUNITY: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND EMPLOYMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 263-310 (Frank D. Bean & Stephanie Bell-Rose eds., 1999)
[hereinafter Newly Emerging Hispanic Communities].
42 Newly Emerging Hispanic Communities, supra note 41, at 273.
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Southwest. In 1990, for example, there were only three states
outside of this region in which the Hispanic share of the total
population exceeded ten percent: Florida, New York, and New
Jersey.43
But throughout the 1990s, Hispanics moved their communities
beyond these traditional, port-of-entry states and began to settle in
other states, such as Utah, that had little or no prior history or
experience with Hispanic immigrants.' In fact, according to the
2000 census, twenty-seven states registered relative increases in
their Hispanic population that exceeded the national average.45
Four Southern states-North Carolina, Georgia, Arkansas, and
Tennessee-led the nation in relative Hispanic population change
between 1990 and 2000.46 Many of the other states experiencing
rapid Hispanic population growth, as Table Six illustrates, are in
the U.S. Heartland (e.g., Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, and Nebraska),
the Mountain region (e.g., Utah), and the Pacific Northwest (e.g.,
Washington).
Table 6: Total and Hispanic Population Change, by State, 1990-2000
Place Total Population Hispanic Population
1990 2000 A(%) 1990 1 2000 A(%)
IYT QAQ 7 Q " ' I 1i A'. 1 O 1 1 1 1 11 1 T A0; 11 Wu 1;iu 5 '704A
New
Hisp
Mag
Ala.
Ark.
Colo
111.4
anic
nets
4,040,587 4,447,100 10.1 24,629 75,830 207.9
2,350,725 2,673,400 13.7 19,876 86,866 337.0
3.294.394 4.301.261 30.6 424,302 735,601 73.4 I
43 See Table Six.
44 See Edward Carter, A Second Migration: Southern Mexico Town Nearly Vacant
as Thousands Move to Provo from Ville Corona, UTAH VALLEY MAG., Nov.-Dec., 2001,
at 44, 46 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
45 See Table Six.
46 Id.
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Ga. 6,478,216 8,186,453 26.4 108,922 435,227 299.6
Idaho 1,006,749 1,293,953 28.5 52,927 101,690 92.1
Iowa 2,776,755 2,926,324 5.4 32,647 82,473 152.6
Kan. 2,477,574 2,688,418 8.5 93,670 188,252 101.0
Ky. 3,685,296 4,041,769 9.7 21,984 59,939 172.7
Md. 4,781,468 5,296,486 10.8 125,102 227,916 82.2
Mich. 9,295,297 9,938,444 6.9 201,596 323,877 60.7
Minn. 4,375,099 4,919,479 12.4 53,884 143,382 166.1
Mo. 5,117,073 5,595,211 9.3 61,702 118,592 92.2
Neb. 1,578,385 1,711,263 8.4 36,969 94,425 155.4
Nev. 1,201,833 1,998,257 66.3 124,419 393,970 216.7
N.C. 6,628,637 8,049,313 21.4 76,726 378,963 393.9
Okla. 3,145,585 3,450,654 9.7 86,160 179,304 108.1
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1, Census 1990 Summary
File 1, http://factfinder.census.gov/servletIDatasetMainPageServlet?_lang=en.
What is driving Hispanic population redistribution trends?
Research indicates that employers in many of these states,
especially those in which meat and poultry processing plants are
concentrated, as well as those in which tourism is the primary
economic driver, are actively involved in the recruitment of
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Hispanic immigrants to fill their pressing labor needs.47
Sometimes this recruitment is done through illegal channels, as
recent indictments against Tyson Foods allege.48
In other instances, studies indicate that state governments are
responding to their absolute population declines by declaring
themselves to be "immigrant friendly" communities. For example,
Iowa (whose population is ninety-six percent white but declining,
due to the wholesale exodus of its young people) has launched "an
all-out immigrant recruitment drive," which is designed to make it
the Ellis Island of the Midwest.49
In these new Hispanic "magnet states," as I have characterized
them elsewhere,5" Hispanic newcomers are settling primarily in
metropolitan communities, as seen in Figure Four below.51 Unlike
the temporary migration flows typically associated with seasonal
farm work, this migration mainly consists of Hispanic families
who appear to be permanently settling and transforming the social,
47 Newly Emerging Hispanic Communities, supra note 41, at 272.
48 Sarah Kershaw, Tennessee Town Loses Allure for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
22, 2001, at A12. The indictment charges the company and the executives with
arranging to transport illegal immigrants across the border and helping them to obtain
counterfeit work papers so that the illegal immigrants could work in more than thirteen
poultry plants in nine different states. Id. As of the date of this article, there are no
reported opinions because the parties have not yet gone to trial.
49 Pam Belluck, Short of People, Iowa Seeks to Be Ellis Island of Midwest, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2000, at Al. More specifically, Iowa officials have sought to make the
state an "immigration enterprise zone," which involves "seeking an exemption from
federal immigration quotas, working with the State Department or refugee organizations
to make Iowa a priority destination for refugees, helping companies recruit employees
abroad, [and] even having the governor make sales pitches to prospective dmigrds." Id.
The state also wants more federal immigration agents in Iowa's district to process
newcomers faster. These strategies aim to create a workforce for a vibrant economy, as
currently there are not enough workers to attract new business or to allow existing
businesses to expand. Id. The foregoing strategies for making Iowa the Ellis Island of
the Midwest are part of a larger strategy to make the state "technologically competitive
and for developing nonagricultural industries" by 2010. Id.
50 James H. Johnson, Jr., Karen D. Johnson-Webb & Walter C. Farrell, Jr., A
Profile of Hispanic Newcomers to North Carolina, POPULAR Gov'T, Fall 1999, at 8
[hereinafter Profile].
51 Note that Figure Four only represents the U.S. cities, or "Magnet Communities,"
where Hispanics have most recently been immigrating to and populating. Thus, while
there are still Hispanics populating the "Traditional" Hispanic states, those cities are
simply not reflected in Figure Four.
[Vol. 27
2002] IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS 435
economic, and political fabric of these communities.52
Despite reports of growing tensions between the Hispanic
newcomers and the long-term residents of these communities,53
there is no reason to believe that this population redistribution
trend will cease any time in the near future. With 35.3 million
Hispanics living in the United StateSn-most of whom are young
and in their childbearing years55-rates of natural increase among
New Hispanic Magnet States
Traditional" Hispanic States
Other States
* County with substantial gains in
Hispanic populations between
1990 and 2000
James H. Johnson, Jr., 201
Figure 4. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 122 (2000), available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/
aboutins/statistics/FY99Yearbook.pdf.
52 Profile, supra note 50, at 8.
53 ld. at 9.
54 See Table Five.
55 In 2000, the fertility rate for non-Hispanic whites was sixty births per 1,000
women, while the Hispanic fertility rate was ninety-five births per 1,000 women. BACHA
& O'CONNELL, supra note 39, at 3-4. Furthermore, in 2000, for example, approximately
35.7% of Hispanics were less than eighteen years of age and 32.4% of Hispanics were
between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four. MELISSA THERRIEN & ROBERTO R.
RAMIREZ, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE: THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
this population alone will assure that our communities will
continue to undergo dramatic demographic change in the years
ahead.
E. Societal Impacts
In short, our open-door immigration policy over the past half-
century has enriched the diversity of our nation and all of our
social and economic institutions. Emblematic of how immigration
has enriched U.S. society, twelve percent of the U.S. workforce
was not born in the United States.56 By comparison, only four
percent of Britain's workforce is foreign-born. 57 Moreover, "the
proportion of adult new immigrants with a bachelor's degree or
postgraduate degree is higher than the proportion for adult native-
born Americans."58
At the high-school level, many of the nation's top graduates
who compete successfully for scholarships to attend the nation's
most prestigious colleges and universities are either immigrants
themselves or children of recent immigrants.5 9 At the college and
university level, international students and children of immigrants
not only culturally enrich our higher education institutions, but
they are also principally responsible for nearly all of the
enrollment growth in the physical sciences, math, and engineering
programs at both the undergraduate and graduate levels of higher
education.6°
MARCH 2000, at 2-3 (2002).
56 Christopher Walker, Expert View: The Huddled Masses Are Our Allies and Not
Our Enemies, INDEP. (London), Sept. 30, 2001, at B6, 2001 WL 27711906.
57 Id.
58 Source of Vitality, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 16, 2001, at B6, 2001 WL
9588440.
59 Ruben Rumbaut, Assimilation and Its Discontents: Ironies and Paradoxes, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 179-83.
60 Diana Jean Schemo, Senate Bill Would Stiffen Some Controls Over Visas, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at B7. Emblematic of the role that international students play in
graduate programs in engineering and sciences,
47 percent of the doctoral degrees issued in 1999 were awarded to students from
other nations. At the New Jersey Institute of Technology in Newark, the figure
was 80 percent. At the Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, foreign
students earned 73 percent of the doctorates. At Rockefeller University in New
York, 61 percent of the doctorates awarded in 1999 went to students from
abroad.
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In private enterprise, immigrants serve as CEOs of many of the
nation's Fortune 500 companies.6' In fact, immigrants headed
many of the high-technology start-up companies that fueled the
economic boom of the 1990s. Lastly, many service sector
industries would not be able to compete were it not for their
largely immigrant labor force.62
Finally, recent studies indicate that immigration-driven
population change in the United States is reshaping the nonprofit
landscape. 63  Among other issues, ethnic charities are fighting
some of the immigration restrictions imposed after the September
11 th attacks as well as mobilizing support to address a wide range
of social and economic problems that plague immigrant and ethnic
minority communities. 64 But these restrictions are a necessity
because unfortunately, our open-door immigration policy is what
allowed terrorists to enter our country, hijack, and crash four
jetliners into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a rural
area in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001.65
In New York alone, an estimated 3,000 people lost their
lives.66  Strangely enough, the death toll reflects the extent to
Id.
61 Del Jones, USA Plucks CEOs from All Across the World, USA TODAY, Oct. 2,
2001, at lB.
62 This was certainly the case for hospitality sector businesses in the World Trade
Center towers. As Polakow-Suransky observed, "[w]hen the World Trade Center
collapsed, it destroyed a huge informal economy that surrounded it." Sasha Polakow-
Suransky, The Invisible Victims: Undocumented Workers at the World Trade Center,
AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 3, 2001, at 11, available at http://www.prospect.org/printIV12/21/
polakow-suransky-s.html. Most of the food-service workers who were employed in and
around the towers and lost their lives in the attacks simply had no proof of employment.
They were paid under the table, some had fake social security numbers, some had none
at all, and still others had completely false identities. Id. Because of their undocumented
status, it has been very difficult for their loved ones to access any of the benefits that
have been made available in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, especially those
offered by the federal government. Id.
63 Michael Anft, Tapping Ethnic Wealth, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 10, 2002,
at4.
64 Michael Anft, Cultivating Opportunity, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 10,
2002, at 16; Michael Anft, Immigrant Rights Organizations Face Fallout of September
11th, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 10, 2002, at 18.
65 See Table Seven.
66 Lena H. Sun & Jacqueline L. Salmon, After Criticism, Compensation Boosted
for Sept. 11 Families, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2002, at A1; Cable News Network (CNN),
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which our open-door immigration policy over the past half-century
has made our nation a truly global community. For example,
those who died in New York were an internationally diverse
group, representing more than sixty countries.67
III. Immigration Loopholes and National Security Gaps
The terrorists responsible for the September 11 th attacks took
advantage of several major loopholes in our immigration laws and
our national security infrastructure.68 As argued below, INS and
other governmental officials knew about most of these loopholes
prior to the tragic events of September 1 th, but either they took
no action to address them, or were thwarted by lobbyists for one
cause or another in their efforts to take such action.69
A. Immigration Status of Hijackers
Table Seven describes the immigrant status of the nineteen
hijackers at the time of the September 11th attacks and reveals that
nine of the hijackers were lawfully in the United States, admitted
between May and July 2001 on nonimmigrant tourist visas.7°
Table Seven also shows that one of the hijackers, Hani Hanjour,
was admitted in December 2000 on a nonimmigrant student visa,
but his status at the time of the September 1 1th attacks is
uncertain.7 Having overstayed the terms of the visas that allowed
them lawful admittance in the first instance, the status of three of
the hijackers became unlawful. And for six of the hijackers, there
is no record of entry into the United States, which means they
probably entered the country illegally, according to some
commentators.72
Inside the World Trade Center After the Attacks (Dec. 19, 2001), at http://www.cnn.con/
2001/US/12/19/rec.cauchon.wtc.cnna (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
67 Keep the Door Open-Safely, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at B14.
68 Schemo & Pear, supra note 3, at Al.
69 Terrorism and Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at A26.
70 See Table Seven.
71 See Table Seven.
72 Eunice Moscoso, Security: 6 Entered U.S. With a Trace; 3 of 13 Other Hijackers
Had Expired Visas, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 12, 2001, at A 13.
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Table 7: Immigration Status of the September 11 Hijackers
Flight Name Status Admitted
American Airlines Adulaziz Alomari ,Lawful, June 2001
Flight 11 Wail Alshehri No Record No Record
(Crashed into World Waleed Alshehri Unlawful June 2000
Trade Center North Salam Al Suqami No Record No Record
Tower) MoamdAta Lawful July 2001
American Airlines Ahmed Alghamdi Unlawful No Record
Flight 175 Hamza Alghamdi No Record No Record
(Crashed into World Marwan Al-Shehhi Lawful May 2001
Trade Center South Mohand Alshehri No Record No Record
Tower) Fayez Banihammad No Record No Record
American Airlines Navaf Alhazmi Unlawful Jan. 2000
Flight 77 Salemn Alhazmi 'Lawful June 2001
.(Crashed into Khalid Almihdhar '  Lafwful . July 2001
the Pentagon) - Hani Hanjour Uncertain* Dec. 2000,
* Admitted on student Majed Moqed Lawful May 2001
visak •_ __.... . .... _. .
United Airlines Saeed Alghamdi No Record No Record
Flight 93 Ahmed Al Haznawi Lawful June 2001
(Crashed in Ahmed Alnami Lawful May 2001
Pennsylvania) Ziad Jarrah Lawful July 2001
Source: Eunice Moscoso, Security: 6 entered U.S. With a Trace; 3 of 13 Other
-Hijackers had ,Expired Visas, ATLANTA J.& CONST Oct. 12,-2001, at A1.3; John
Ritter, Crackdown on Visas May Have Limited Effect, USA TODAY, Oct. 23, 2001,
"at IGA.
B. Loopholes Exploited
The fact that nine of the September 11 th hijackers were in the
United States legally highlights shortcomings in the nonimmigrant
visa applicant screening process, which takes place in U.S.
embassies and consulates around the world. Research indicates
that most officials in these overseas offices are young,
inexperienced, and so overworked that they only spend an average
of about three minutes interviewing each visa applicant.73 As
73 Mark Krikorian & Steven Camarota, How Did the Terrorists Get In?, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 19, 2001, at Al9, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a2001/
09/19/ED192385.DTL.
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Mark Krikorian and Steven Camarota from the Center for
Immigration Studies point out, "they are pressured to approve a
high proportion of applicants to avoid offending the host
country."74  The work is characterized as a "dreaded 'rite of
passage' for rookie Foreign Service officers. ' 75 Given this state of
affairs, it should not be surprising that some of the terrorists were
able to acquire tourist visas to enter the United States.76
The guidelines to secure a student visa are more stringent than
the ones for a tourist visa.77 For example, a commitment from a
U.S. school is a prerequisite for consideration of a student visa and
once admitted, the foreign student recipients are supposed to
attend school full-time (i.e., they are not allowed to work) and to
maintain a minimum grade point average.78 The fact that Hani
Hanjour entered on a student visa79 but never enrolled in school
highlights another flaw in the nonimmigrant visa program that is
above and beyond the inadequate screening problem. But how
was Hanjour (who some believe was likely flying the plane that
crashed into the Pentagon) 8° able to remain in the United States
even though he never enrolled in the California school to study
74 Id.
75 Id. In some countries, the screening of applicants is not done by U.S. foreign
service workers, but rather by third-nation nationals. Commenting on the situation in the
U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia, a U.S. citizen who worked for the Saudi Ministry of
Defense stated that "the visa operation in Riyadh is a 'joke' because [the U.S. Embassy]
is staffed by 'third-nation nationals."' Thomas Farragher & Alice Dembner, LAX,
Outdated System at Root of INS Troubles, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2001, at Al. This
source further stated that, "U.S. citizens don't handle the paperwork up front. The
application process is handled by Pakistanis, Indians, Sudanese, Somalis, because they
work for less money." Id.
76 In his article, Wayne Merry argues that "Congress is also part of the problem.
Lawmakers tend to regard visa and immigration issues as clerical work rather than as
national defense and for decades have starved these operations for money, for adequate
staff, technology and facilities." Wayne W. Merry, Terrorists Entered U.S. Legally,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Oct. 1, 2001, at B7.
77 Andrew Mollison, Student Visas Don't Track Terrorists, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Nov. 1, 2001, at A] 3. Despite the more stringent guidelines, it has been estimated that in
2000, 3761 students from nations that are considered to sponsor terrorism have studied in
the United States. Schemo, supra note 60, at B7.
78 Mollison, supra note 77, at A13.
79 See Table Seven.
80 Philip Shenon, Flight School Warned F.B.I. of Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
2001, at B 1.
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English, as stipulated in his student visa? He was able to do so
because the INS had no system in place to monitor and track him
after he entered the United States.8"
According to Michael Hedges, knowledge of this flaw in the
student visa system dates back to the late 1970s "when the INS
had been unable to provide a list of Iranian students in America
after the U.S. Embassy was seized in Tehran."82 The problem was
reaffirmed in 1993 when a group of terrorists bombed the World
Trade Center, for one member of the group had entered the United
States on a student visa to study engineering at Wichita State
University.83
In 1996, following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,
Congress amended the immigration law to require the INS to
establish a computerized tracking system for international students
by 2003.84 Pursuant to this directive, a computerized tracking
system was developed and pilot-tested in 1997.85 However, the
International Association of Educators successfully lobbied
against its implementation on the grounds that it would stigmatize
international students and impose an undue financial burden on
them.86
Commenting on the lack of such a tracking system, Grimaldi,
Fainaru, and Gaul noted that "the INS is unable to track more than
half a million foreign students-from nuclear engineering scholars
to 20,000 pilot trainees-giving terrorists potential access to
dangerous technology and training."8  In hindsight, it is clear that
the September 11 th terrorists took advantage of the fact that the
81 James V. Grimaldi et al., Losing Track of Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST, Oct.
7, 2001, at Al.
82 Michael Hedges, Delays Hurt Foreign Student Tracking, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 7,
2001, at 16A.
83 Grimaldi et al., supra note 81, at Al.
84 See Dave Curtin, Student Visa Plan Criticized, DENv. POST, Oct. 31, 2001, at
13A.
85 Mark Bixler, State Colleges Help INS Track Foreign Students, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Mar. 13, 2002, at IE; Kate Zernike & Christopher Drew, Efforts to Track
Foreign Students Are Said to Lag, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at Al.
86 Hedges, supra note 82, at 16A. Under the plan, a ninety-five dollar fee would be
imposed on international students to finance the computerized tracking system. Id.
87 Grimaldi et al., supra note 81, at Al.
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United States did not have such a tracking system in place.88
Two of the hijackers were able to enroll in flight school even
though they did not have student visas89 because under
immigration law, only a vocational education (M-1) visa is
required for flight schools. 90 However, even if student visas had
been required and some sort of tracking system had existed, these
two individuals still would not have been caught for three reasons.
First, the tracking system was designed to track people with
student visas, but these two had reportedly entered the United
States on tourist visas. 9' Second, it is unlikely that they would
have been caught because the INS reportedly did not closely
monitor second-tier colleges and vocational schools. 92 And third,
the flight schools were not required to check visa documents
before allowing foreign students to enroll in their training
programs.
93
As stated previously, several of the hijackers overstayed their
visas,94 which is a major loophole in U.S. immigration policy that
has plagued federal efforts to adequately address the illegal
immigration problem. Furthermore, as Francisco Rivera-Batiz
points out, the stereotypical image of an illegal or undocumented
immigrant is an unskilled, low-income worker "surreptitiously
crossing the Rio Grande." 95  However, a large portion of the
undocumented alien population, as the September 1 1th attacks
confirm, are usually well-educated individuals who enter the
88 The system was supposed to contain information on foreign students in the
United States on student (F-i) and vocational education (M-1) visas. Because the
tracking system would have included, among other information, data on home and U.S.
addresses, classes in which students were enrolled, and faculty advisors, Hedges points
out that it would have allowed U.S. officials to identify patterns of education and training
by nationality, region, or origin (e.g., Middle Easterners enrolled in flight training). The
data would have also enabled officials to identify people who had overstayed the terms
of their visas. Hedges, supra note 82, at 16A.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 Schemo & Pear, supra note 3, at Al.
92 Grimaldi, et al., supra note 81, at Al.
93 Id.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
95 Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, Underground on American Soil: Undocumented
Workers and US Immigration Policy, 53 J. INT'L AFF. 485, 485 (2000).
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country legally on temporary visas but become illegal immigrants
when they intentionally overstay the terms of their visas.
Carolyn Lochhead reports that "of the estimated 5 million to 6
million illegal immigrants in the country, roughly half have
entered legally as visitors who failed to leave when required.
More than ninety percent of those 'overstays' are tourist or
business travelers. 96 Describing this population further, Rivera-
Batiz states that
[w]ith legal visas in their hands, prospective illegals can simply
walk through the inspection booths at US international airports.
Once they overstay their visas, most of them seek to blend
quietly into American society, expecting to avoid detection and
any ensuing problems with the INS. Since they tend to have
higher levels of education, their adjustment to the US economy
is much smoother than that of unskilled immigrants.
97
Notwithstanding the fact that many nonimmigrants are
overstaying their visas and possibly even becoming undocumented
as a result, the United States has concentrated its efforts, for the
most part, on curtailing the illegal flow of poor immigrants into
the country, especially from Mexico. By way of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986,98 for example, the U.S.
government implemented an amnesty program, which was
designed to saturate labor demand and thereby stem the illegal
entry of poor immigrants into the United States. Any
undocumented immigrant who could demonstrate that he or she
had lived in the United States before 1982 was eligible to apply for
citizenship under this Act.99
Research indicates that three million undocumented aliens
took advantage of this opportunity to become U.S. citizens.1°° But
at the completion of the amnesty program in October of 1988,
there were an estimated 2.7 million undocumented immigrants
96 Carolyn Lochhead, Ashcroft Names Those Unwelcome; Supporters, Members of
46 Groups Banned, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 1, 2001, at AI0 2001 WL 3418495.
97 Rivera-Batiz, supra note 95, at 494.
98 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
99 Id.
100 See Table One.
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remaining in the United States.' °' Some were poor Mexican
immigrants who did not trust the U.S. government enough to apply
for amnesty. 10 2  An untold number were probably nonimmigrant
visa violators.
In part because the illegal immigrant population continued to
grow after the 1986 amnesty legislation was enacted, reaching an
estimated nine million in 2001,03 the United States began to
impose more draconian measures and policies to deter illegal
immigration during the late 1990s.104 Modeled after California's
Proposition 187,105 these new reforms, including the Illegal
Immigrant Responsibility and Immigration Reform Act of 1996106
and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996,107 were anchored in the erroneous
view 10 8 that most illegal immigrants are poor and thus come to the
United States to take advantage of welfare and other public sector
programs. 109
101 See Table One.
102 Jim Nesbitt, Immigrant Amnesty Debate to Heat Up, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), July 26, 2001, at 11.
103 See Table One.
104 Marlin Maddoux, Terrorism and Immigration, at http://www.pointofview.net/
ar_immigration.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Point of View is a non-profit,
educational organization established in 1972 that led to the creation of a nationwide talk
program on Christian issues called Point of View Radio Talk Show, which transmits
daily via satellite.
105 A ballot initiative passed by California voters in 1994, Proposition 187 was
immediately the subject of litigation, and most of its provisions were held
unconstitutional. The preliminary injunction against enforcement was made permanent
by Federal District Court Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer in League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Wilson, 18 IMMIGR. CAS. REP. A3-121, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3368 (C.D.
Cal. 1998). Discussion about the procedural aspects of the litigation can be found in the
trial court's opinion. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297
(9th Cir. 1997).
106 Illegal Immigrant Responsibility and Immigration Reform Act of 1996,
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18
U.S.C.).
107 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 104
Pub. L. No. 193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25, and 42
U.S.C.).
108 See generally, Rivera-Batiz, supra note 95, at 485.
109 Maddoux, supra note 104.
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The INS focused most of its attention on beefing up security
along the U.S.-Mexican border,"' with an eye toward stemming
the tide of poor Mexican immigrants from entering the United
States as well as curbing illegal drug trafficking. In the process, it
devoted inadequate attention to the following two national security
risks, which appear to have been exploited by the terrorists
involved in the September 11th attacks. First, the federal
government failed to recognize that "the six countries of Central
America-Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, and Panama-have become a jumping off point to the
United States for illegal immigrants from around the world."'' . In
fact, the evidence suggests that one of the hijackers, Mohamed
Atta, was a naturalized citizen of Nicaragua," 2 which suggests that
this may have been the route he took to enter the United States.
Second was the failure to adequately monitor the flow of
people into the United States via the U.S.-Canadian border." 3
There is some evidence suggesting that at least two of the
hijackers may have entered the United States illegally from
Canada." 4 But prior to the September 1 lth attacks, U.S. officials
were aware that the 5525-mile Canadian border posed a potential
national security risk." 5 For example, Ahmed Ressam, an al-
Qaeda network member who was trained at a terrorist camp in
Afghanistan, was caught while attempting to enter the United
States illegally via Port Angeles, Washington, from Canada in
December 1999.116 Ressam has been dubbed "the millennium
bomber" because the trunk of his rental car was filled with
explosives that he allegedly was going to use to blow up the Los
Angeles International Airport during the 2000 New Year's
110 Robert Pear, Tightened Inspections Mean Delays From Maine to West, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A21.
II Andrew Bounds, Illegal Immigration Becomes Focus of Terrorism Fight, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, http://specials.ft.com/theresponse/FT3XHB3S4SC.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
112 Id.
113 Pear, supra note I10, at A21.
114 Maddoux, supra note 104.
115 Pear, supra note 110, at A21.
116 Colin Nickerson, U.S. Wary of 'Time Bombs' Waiting to Strike from North,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4, 2002, at A12.
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celebration.' 17
Why would potential terrorists try to gain access to the United
States via the Canadian border? Such individuals probably find it
easier to enter from Canada undetected because the United States
has devoted more time and money to control the U.S.-Mexican
border than it has to control the U.S.-Canadian border. This
investment of federal government resources to control the southern
border more than the northern border was due to the prevailing
view that most illegal immigrants were poor and interested in
coming to the United States to take advantage of liberal public
benefits.
Between 1994 and 2001,'18 the United States equipped the
northern border with only twenty-eight new guards, while the
southern border received 9,056. On September 1 th, when the
terrorists attacked the United States, there was one guard for every
1,300 feet along the southern border, but only one for every twelve
miles along the U.S-Canadian border." 9  Because inadequate
federal resources were allocated to northern border control, some
stretches were only patrolled during the day between 8:00 A.M.
and 5:00 P.M., while other stretches were not monitored at all. 120
Moreover, it appears that terrorists took advantage of Canada's
traditionally liberal attitude toward immigration. In fact,
"Canada's generous political asylum laws, a shortage of law
enforcement resources and difficulties tracking aliens who enter
the country and then disappear, have made Canada a haven for
terrorists." 12  Also, it is estimated that more than fifty terrorist
groups have established beachheads in Canada. 22 Although U.S.
officials were well aware of the national security risks that the
Canadian border posed, almost no attention was devoted to the
problem, as previously noted.
23
117 Id.
118 Grimaldi et al., supra note 81, at Al.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Neil Seeman, The Canadian Connection: Whose Brother Are We Anyway?,
NAT'L REV., Sept. 26, 2001, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-
seeman092601.shtml.
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The September 1 1th terrorists who entered the United States
without leaving a trace may have entered under fake names or
using doctored passports.124 This highlights another loophole in
U.S. immigration policy and relates to the so-called visa waiver
program, which is designed to minimize threats to national
security. 125  Because citizens from twenty-nine "low risk"
countries are allowed to enter the United States without visas, 26
citizens from these visa waiver countries do not have to file a
written application with a U.S. consulate and do not have to go
through U.S. Department of State interview and background
checks. They only have to fill out a form
usually while en route to the United States by airplane... [and]
once they arrive at a port of entry, they spend a minute with an
inspector from the Immigration and Naturalization Service....
In 1999, about half of all foreign visitors to the U.S.-close to
17 million-were from visa waiver countries.
127
This lack of scrutiny has created a black market in stolen and
falsified passports from visa waiver countries. As a former
immigration officer notes, "stolen or forged passports from
countries on a visa waiver program are coveted in the underworld.
They are a valuable commodity because they guarantee easy
access to the United States."'
128
124 Dave Wedge, War on Terrorism; Atta, 8 Other Hijackers Were Here Legally
Feds Say, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 12, 2001, at 02, 2001 WL 3813478.
125 See Jo Craven McGinty, Rude Awakening; Attacks Open Eyes to Weaknesses in
Visa-Waiver Program, NEWSDAY, Oct. 9, 2001, at A39, 2001 WL 9254931.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Mike Adams, INS Unable to Track Millions Inside U.S.: No Computer System,
So Those Who Overstay Visas Can Easily Vanish, BALT. SUN, Sept. 22, 2001, at 7A,
2001 WL 6170369. Whereas in the past, one needed expertise or skills in photography
or printing to generate fake passports and IDs, with the advent of scanners and computer
software, all one needs is "a ride to Circuit City." Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, With
Security Tight, Border Officials Focus on Fake IDs; Countries Crack Down on Black
Market, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2001, at A4. However, because the ability to detect fake
documents has also improved, the demand for authentic documents has grown
tremendously. This has heightened efforts to steal authentic documents. Emblematic of
the magnitude of the problem,
last year, INS border inspectors apprehended 52,000 people for document fraud
in San Ysidro, the busiest U.S. port of entry, which links Tijuana to San Diego.
Of those arrested trying to enter the United States illegally, 32,000-nearly 62
percent-were carrying someone else's identification. More than 7,000 others
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Prior to the tragic events of September 1 1th, it was known that
one of the terrorists involved in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing abused this program. 129 Also, despite a 1999 inspector
general report documenting abuses of the program by terrorists,
criminals, and alien smugglers, "Congress voted last year to make
the 12-year pilot program permanent."' 3 ° It is unclear whether any
of the September 1 1th terrorists exploited the visa waiver program,
but "six suspects believed connected to the attacks were arrested in
Spain [which is a visa-waiver country], where they were
manufacturing passports."
'131
C. Weaknesses in the National Security Infrastructure
Finally, the September 1 1th attacks highlighted major
shortcomings in the U.S. national security and intelligence
infrastructure. 3 2 In some instances, federal agencies had access to
critical intelligence information about impending terrorist attacks
but were unable to decipher it. For example, "[a]fter the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center, the FBI discovered it had
possessed documents, videos, and even a recorded phone call that
might have tipped them off about the attack beforehand. But the
material was in Arabic and had never been translated."1 33
In other instances, research indicates that various federal
agencies (FBI, INS, CIA, Federal Aviation Administration, and
the National Security Agency) failed to share critical intelligence
information about potential terrorists. For example, although two
of the September hijackers were reportedly on the FBI's watch list
of suspected terrorists, one of them, Mohamed Atta, was able to
get a pilot's license from the FAA, and other suspected terrorists
presented counterfeit or altered documents.
Id.
129 Schemo & Pear, supra note 3, at Al.
130 McGinty, supra note 125, at A39. When former President Clinton was asked
why he signed the law establishing the twenty-nine country visa waiver program, he
stated that "it would help generate billions of dollars in tourist and business revenue."
U.S. Visa Reviews on 6 Countries, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Oct. 31, 2001, at 14,
LEXIS, News Library, Major Newspaper file.
131 McGinty, supra note 125, at A39.
132 Daniel J. Oates, The F.B.L Can't Do It Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at A17.
133 Jay Bookman, Global War 1: Modem Economy Binds Friend to Foe in Deadly
Embrace, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 7, 2001, at IF.
[Vol. 27
2002] IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS 449
were able to obtain commercial driver's licenses that allowed them
to transport hazardous materials. 1
34
In still other instances, federal agencies have failed to act on
leads or warnings regarding potential terrorist attacks. For
example, an instructor at a Minnesota flight school "[w]amed the
FBI in August of his suspicion that a student who was later
identified as part of Osama bin Laden's terror network might be
planning to use a commercial plane loaded with fuel as a
weapon."'135 The student, Zacarias Moussaoui, was subsequently
indicted "on charges of conspiring in the Sept. 11 terror
attacks." 136 In addition, the Arizona branch of the flight school
reportedly alerted the FAA that one of its students, Hani
Hanjour,137 spoke little English, which is a requirement to enroll in
flight school. 138 Federal officials did not respond proactively in
either of these instances, 139 although with Hanjour, the FAA
reportedly recommended that the flight school find him a tutor to
help him with the English language. 4 0
IV. Efforts to Boost Homeland Security
A. General Overview
The Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress moved
quickly in the aftermath of the September 1 th attacks to plug the
loopholes in our immigration policy and to address security
concerns more generally. Most of the immediate responses are
contained in the USA Patriot Act of 2001. TM
In brief, the Patriot Act:
* Tightens rules on student visas;
134 Maddoux, supra note 104.
135 Shenon, supra note 80, at B1.
136 Id.
137 See supra notes 71, 79-81 and accompanying text.
138 Shenon, supra note 80, at B1.
139 Maddoux, supra note 104.
140 Shenon, supra note 80, at B1.
141 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
" Cracks down on those who overstay the terms of their visas;
* Establishes a foreign terrorist tracking taskforce;
* Broadens the powers of law enforcement to pursue
terrorism through search warrants and eavesdropping;
* Triples border control and customs presence along the
5525-mile U.S.-Canadian border;
" Works with Mexico and Canada to develop a common
database designed to prevent suspected terrorists from
entering the U.S.; and
" Delays efforts to ease immigration regulations for Mexican
workers. 14
2
To oversee these efforts, the Bush Administration established
an Office of Homeland Security, which is housed in the White
House and Tom Ridge, the former governor of Pennsylvania, was
tapped to head the office. 143
B. Public Reactions
For the most part, opinion polls reveal widespread public
support for these governmental efforts regarding border controls
and anti-terrorism,'" which represent a radical departure from past
approaches to U.S. policy-making, especially in the areas of
immigration and international commerce. Prior to September
1 th, the economic benefits of an open-door immigration policy
were viewed as far outweighing any related security risks. In fact,
any legislative proposal that would constrain the free movement of
people or commerce was strongly opposed and usually voted
142 Id.
143 Susan Baer, Ridge Faces Domestic Challenge as He Takes Counter-Terror Post,
BALT. SUN, Oct. 8, 2001, at 4A. Moreover, according to Bush Administration officials,
security issues will be a major focus of the 2003 budget. Alison Mitchell, Security
Issues Are Called a Focus of Next Budget, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at B 1.
144 Tom Brazaitis, Survey Finds Most Americans Favor Requiring Citizens to Carry
ID Card, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Oct. 6, 2001, at A9; Robert O'Harrow, Jr. &
Jonathan Krim, National ID Card Gaining Support, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2001 at Al;
Laurie Goodstein, Stereotyping Rankles Silent Majority of American Muslims, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at A20; Tasgola Karala Bruner, Overstaying Welcome: Bush's
Policy on Visa Violators is Supported, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 1, 2001, at 2C;
Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Sept. 11 Changes Were for Better, Poll Majority Says,
WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2002, at Al; Robin Toner & Janet Elder, Public Is Wary But
Supportive On Rights Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al.
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down.145  But the September lth attacks demonstrated in a
dramatic way that inherent in our liberal policies in the areas of
immigration and international commerce were major threats to our
national security.
Now it appears that the pendulum has swung in the opposite
direction, with security assuming a more important role vis-a-vis
economics in policymaking. To the extent that reservations have
been voiced or expressed about this policy shift, they have focused
primarily on perceived threats to civil liberties and to the ability of
the United States to spread democracy throughout the world. 146
Concerns about violations of civil liberties have arisen from
the U.S. Justice Department's efforts to question young Middle
Eastern men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-three from
countries with suspected links to terrorism.4 7 This effort has been
criticized on the grounds that the list was compiled, not on the
basis of suspected terrorism, but rather "on national origin, age,
and other personal characteristics."' 48 This initiative has also led
to complaints of racial profiling and stereotyping, especially
among Arab Americans and moderate or cultural Muslims.149
Moreover, according to Jodi Wilgoren, as of December 22,
2001, the Department of Justice had received information on only
about half of the 5,146 young, foreign men wanted for
questioning, and only two leads had emanated from the
145 Krikorian & Camarota, supra note 73, at A19.
146 Toner & Elder, supra note 144, at Al.
147 Adam Clymer, Bush Quickly Signs Measure Aiding Antiterrorism Effort, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2001, at B5; Richard Ruelas, Muslim Men Jailed for Having Arresting
Profile, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 10, 2001, at B1, http://www.arizonarepublic.com/
special44/articles/1010ruelaslO.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation); Linda Hills, Civil Rights vs. Terrorists'
Wrongs; A Return to Frontier Justice?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 3, 2001, at B7,
2001 WL 27292478; Jonathan Peterson & Patrick J. McDonnell, Tightening Immigration
Raises Civil Liberties Flag, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at A12.
148 Jodi Wilgoren, Sweep of Foreign Men Half-Finished as Deadline Passes, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2001, at B4.
149 The latter are defined as immigrants and many of their American-born children
"grew up in places like Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia or Turkey in families that did not find
it necessary to be religiously observant or to express their Islamic identities because they
lived in predominantly Muslim countries." Goodstein, supra note 144, at A20; Jacob H.
Fries, Complaints of Anti-Arab Bias Crimes Dip, But Concerns Linger, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 2001, at B8.
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canvassing, which raises serious questions about the utility of this
strategy.'50 Other studies suggest that this type of behavior is not
only socially and morally inappropriate, it is also bad for business
in an increasingly diverse society and highly integrated world
economy. 15
Legitimate concerns have also been raised about the Justice
Department's decision to create military tribunals to try foreigners
suspected of terrorism and to permit hearings to be conducted in
secrecy in cases involving immigrants. 52 Commenting on the use
of secret evidence, Glaberson notes that it "relegates immigrants to
a legal netherworld, having to disprove accusations like whether
they have connections to terrorists without knowing specifically
what the accusations are."'' 53 Assessing the problems with secret
detentions and military tribunals, a New York Times editorial
argued that
[o]ur country's enemies only have to spread the word that the
United States government has issued plans that ostensibly permit
trying non-citizens suspected of terrorism in secret military
tribunals and that it is refusing to release the names of hundreds
of people it rounded up as possible suspects after Sept. 11.
Those accurate reports alone are enough to give pause to many
150 Wilgoren, supra note 148, at B4. Commenting on the FBI's effort to determine
the nature and magnitude of an al-Qaeda presence in the United States, a former CIA
official stated that
[o]ut of all the people in custody, they've got one definite al Qaeda and [they]
are suspicious of a couple of others, and they got a lot of people under
surveillance that they aren't sure about .... Insofar as an al Qaeda presence in
the United States, they've made very little headway in uncovering it or peeling
back the layers and penetrating it.... They don't know what they don't know.
Dan Eggen & Bob Woodward, FBI Probe of Al Qaeda Implies Wide Presence; Agency
Investigating 150 U.S. Groups, Individuals, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2001, at Al.
151 James H. Johnson, Jr., Enhancing the Competitiveness of North Carolina
Communities, POPULAR GOV'T, Jan. 1, 2002, at 6-18, available at http://ncinfo.iog
.unc.edu/pubs/electronicversions/pg/pgwin02/articlel .pdf.
152 Robin Toner, Few in Congress Questioning President Over Civil Liberties, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at Al; Anthony Lewis, Dust in Our Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2001, at A21; William Glaberson, Closed Immigration Hearings Criticized as
Prejudicial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B7.
153 William Glaberson, U.S. Asks to Use Secret Evidence In Many Cases Of
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at BI.
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of our friends, and to stoke anti-Americanism.
54
In its critique of these two strategies, the editorial goes on to
observe that "what matters in this global battle against terrorism is
not just the details of what the [Bush] Administration does, but
also the impression that it leaves. It is vital that the United States
be seen as acting in accord with human rights principles."' 55
The federal government's strategy for tightening the rules on
student visas has also been the subject of concern and criticism.
When it was discovered that one of the September 1 lth terrorists
had entered the United States on a student visa, Senator Diane
Feinstein of California, "proposed a six month moratorium on the
issuance of [student] visas as part of the general effort to tighten
the nation's security. '  Her proposal generated widespread
concern among university officials, who argued against the
moratorium by invoking "the lofty values of international
education: spreading democracy, promoting knowledge and
forging ties with future leaders abroad."'' 57  But as Schemo
correctly points out, "the clash illustrated a more prosaic, pressing
side to their concern; the growing financial and intellectual
dependence of universities on students from overseas, particularly
for graduate programs in the sciences, engineering and math."'15
8
Research shows that international students contributed about $11
billion to the U.S. economy through tuition payments and cost of
living expenditures in 1999.1"9
Opposing Senator Feinstein's proposed moratorium, a
representative of the Association of International Educators argued
that "[i]nternational education is considered a form of trade...
one of the [nation's] largest service-industry exports.' 6 ° In large
part due to the opposition from university officials, Senator
154 John Ashcroft Misses the Point, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at A30.
155 Id.
156 Schemo, supra note 60, at B7.
157 Diana Jean Schemo, Eager for Foreign Students, Universities Persuade Senator
to Drop Plan to Limit Visas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at B7; Tasgola Karala Bruner,
Overstaying Welcome: Bush's Policy on Visa Violators is Supported, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Nov. 1, 2001, at 2C.
158 Schemo, supra note 60, at B7.
159 Id.
160 Schemo, supra note 157, at B7.
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Feinstein withdrew her proposal for a moratorium on student
visas, opting instead to support a student tracking system to
monitor students and changes in their status while in the United
States. 161
In an effort to minimize the prospects of future terrorist acts,
the federal government also launched sweeps of workplaces where
significant numbers of undocumented immigrants were thought to
be working.' 62  These so-called "enforcement actions" have
generated considerable controversy, especially in instances where
there is no evidence of ties to terrorism, as in the case of
undocumented Hispanic immigrants. 163  In opposing the sweeps,
critics have argued that immigrants are not the problem; rather, it
is our immigration policy which has created the threats to national
security.,64
Research shows that U.S. employers knowingly and actively
recruited into their firms many of the undocumented immigrants
targeted in these enforcement actions, which suggests that the
federal government should be targeting employers rather than the
undocumented workers. 165 But given their pivotal role in the U.S.
economy, going after employers who have knowingly hired
undocumented immigrants would be unwise at this juncture.
161 Id. According to Schemo, a new bill identifies seven nations-Iran, Iraq, Sudan,
Libya, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea-that are believed to sponsor terrorism. Schemo,
supra note 60, at B7. Under the proposed legislation, nonimmigrants from these nations
will be allowed to enter the United States "only after it has been determined that such
alien does not pose a threat to the safety or national security of the United States
according to standards developed by the Secretary of State." Id.
162 Jesus Lopez, Jr., et al., Rocky Slams Airport Workers' Arrest, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Dec. 13, 2001, at A-I, available at 2001 WL 4653975.
163 Id. Immigration officials contend that they have not altered their enforcement
tactics with regard to Hispanic immigrants since September 11 th, but their sweeps in
Utah, Oregon, Tennessee, and North Carolina, among other states, have
disproportionately impacted Hispanics. See Sam Dillion, Mexican Immigrants Face New
Set of Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at A14; Kershaw, supra note 48, at A12; Steve
Cannon & Dan Egbert, Workers Face More Scrutiny, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Jan. 1, 2002, at DI; David Firestone, Federal Sweep Shifts Attitude of Immigrants
About the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at B6.
164 Krikorian & Camarota, supra note 73, at A19.
165 See Kevin Cantera et al., Airport Buzzes with Blame, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 14,
2001, at Cl, 2001 WL 4654080; Linda Chavez, Airport Security Hiring Fog, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at A21; John Keahey & Michael Vigh, Airport Is at Fault in
Badge Fuss, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 15, 2001, at Al, 2001 WL 4654183.
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Owing to the strong work ethic of immigrants, research further
suggests that several industries, including meatpacking,
agribusiness, construction, and hospitality services, would
probably collapse if undocumented immigrants were summarily
swept up and deported. 66  Further, the September 1 1th attacks
revealed that our airport industries would also suffer if
undocumented immigrants were not available to fill their labor
needs. 167 Moreover, many immigrants who are the targets of these
enforcement actions have children who are U.S. citizens. Thus,
the sweeps disrupt the lives not only of individuals, but also of
intact families.1
68
For the foregoing reasons, these enforcement actions will
likely create animosity and ill will among people from the very
countries with whom the Bush Administration is now proposing to
develop stronger trading relations as part of the government's
overall counter-terrorism strategy. 169 For example, one individual
who was arrested on immigration violations for overstaying his
visa by six weeks in Louisville said, "I used to like the United
States, but now I don't understand it .... I was going to learn
English, but now I don't want to ever speak it again .... They
don't apologize to me .... But it doesn't matter now. I don't
want to be here anymore anyway."'7 ° These enforcement actions
may also discourage foreigners from wanting to come to the
United States as visitors in the future.171
C. Buttressing Homeland Security: Feasible or Futile?
Above and beyond the previously mentioned criticisms of
efforts to reform our immigration policy, concerns have been
raised about the overall feasibility and likely success of ongoing
166 See Newly Emerging Hispanic Communities, supra note 41, at 296-301.
167 Lopez, Jr., et al., supra note 162, at Al.
168 Stephen Hunt, Immigrants' Choice: Trial or Deportation, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec.
15, 2001, at A10, 2001 WL 4654173.
169 See David E. Sanger, Using Battle of Terrorism for Victory on Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at A22, 2001 WL 32002964. U.S. Trade Representative Robert B.
Zoellick, in making the case for streamlined executive trade negotiating authority,
argued that "the war against terrorism hinges on building coalitions, and.., coalitions in
the modem world are built on trade first and ideology second." Id.
170 Firestone, supra note 163, at B6.
171 Id.
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efforts to tighten security in a place as geographically expansive as
the United States. 172  Carr characterizes the whole effort to
heighten homeland defense as a futile undertaking, asserting that
"[d]efending a country as big and commercially robust as the
United States raises profound, and probably insurmountable,
issues of scale."'
173
Beyond the problem of size or scale, Carr states that the free
flow of capital, goods, and services into and out of the country is a
key driver of U.S. competitiveness in the highly integrated world
economy.'74  Viewed from this perspective, he contends that
current efforts to heighten homeland defense are futile because the
U.S border is, by design, porous. 175
I agree with Carr that the threat of future acts of terrorism
against the United States poses major challenges to our nation's
ability to compete in the international marketplace. But I do not
agree with his assessment that current efforts to buttress homeland
defense are futile. Rather, I contend that current efforts, especially
the elements of immigration reform that violate civil liberties, are
misguided, particularly when juxtaposed with the drivers of
globalization. 7 6 In contrast to Carr, I believe that it is possible to
reduce the threat of terrorism without violating civil liberties and
without severely constraining the international flow of people and
commerce. But it will require a re-thinking of our approach to
homeland security along the lines described below.
V. An Alternative Approach to Homeland Security
Alison Mitchell characterized most succinctly the homeland
defense challenge when she posed the following two questions: (1)
"How... does one secure a target-rich nation entered by roughly
1.3 million people, over 340,000 vehicles, and close to 59,000
cargo shipments every day? [and (2)] How many national
172 Carr, supra note 5, at 53-54; Stephen Flynn, Border Bottlenecks: Can There Be
a Cure for the Curse of Maintaining Security?, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept.16, 2001, at C5.
173 Carl, supra note 5, at 53.
174 Id. at 54-55.
175 See id. at 53-54.
176 Kurt M. Campbell, Globalization at War, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2001, at A9;
Flynn, supra note 172, at C5.
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resources should the task consume and who should pay?"' 77 In
attempting to answer these questions, Mitchell cites experts who
argue--correctly in my judgment-that
[t]he United States government alone cannot protect the
homeland. That can only be achieved through aggressive
counterterrorist measures overseas, together with the
cooperation of other governments and businesses, all using
technologies-such as electronic tagging and monitoring,
biometric identity cards-and shared intelligence so officials
around the world can more easily identify suspicious cargo and
individuals. 178
Consistent with this viewpoint, I propose a four-fold strategy
that is designed to balance security and economic competitiveness
without sacrificing personal freedoms.
A. Perimeter Security Strategy
Since September l1th, the U.S. government, as previously
noted, has pursued a range of strategies to buttress homeland
security, including substantially upgrading security along the
U.S.-Canadian border. 179  But substantially enhanced security
along the U.S.-Mexican border during the 1990s did not curtail
the volume of illegal immigration into the United States. In fact,
INS data suggest that the flow actually increased during this
period.1 ° Thus, if the government's prior experience with beefed-
up security along the southern border with Mexico is any
177 Alison Mitchell, Give Me a Home Where the Buffalo Roam Less, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2002, at D5.
178 Id.
179 Anthony DePalma, Canada and U.S. Sign Accord to Tighten Security on Border,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at B7, 2001 WL 9639404; Kevin Diaz, Northern Exposure:
Could Terrorists Exploit Our Friendly Relations with Canada and Our Relaxed Attitude
Toward Its Long Vulnerable Border with Minnesota?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct.
30, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 9639404. Noting that more than "almost a dozen
federal agencies now bear responsibility for controlling the borders," Tom Ridge,
Director of Homeland Security, proposed a new agency, a federal border administration,
which would "take control of the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the border
enforcement functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the
Department of Agriculture's agricultural quarantine inspection program." Allison
Mitchell, Official Urges Combining Several Agencies to Create One That Protects
Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2002, at A8.
180 See Table One.
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barometer of the likely utility of this strategy, the prognosis for
success is not good.
Rather than the current focus on tightening border security,'81 a
perimeter strategy, as some policy analysts and business leaders
have advocated, 82 may prove to be more effective. A perimeter
strategy involving the establishment of a security zone around the
entire North American Continent would shift the responsibility for
security from ports of entry to points of origin; that is, from border
patrols and customs agents to foreign service officers in U.S.
embassies and consulates around the world. In order for this
strategy to work, "the State Department's visa officers overseas
need to be recognized as 'America's other border patrol."" 83
In addition, this strategy will require substantial increases in
the number of embassy and consular staff around the world as well
as enhanced staff training to improve the screening of applicants
who wish to enter the United States on a permanent or temporary
basis. Every applicant should be subjected to a rigorous or
comprehensive background check, which means that the visa
waiver program should be eliminated. 84  And those granted
permission to enter the United States should be provided with a
tamper-proof identification card containing personal biometric
data that would allow them to be tracked while they are in the
United States.'85
181 Ritter, supra note 33, at 10A.
182 Louis Freedberg & Anastasia Hendrix, Attacks Redefine Border Strategy: Focus
Widens to Entire Continent, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 30, 2001, at Al, 2001 WL 3415757;
Allan Thompson, Canada, U.S. Edge Toward Joint Screening, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 31,
2001, at 8, 2001 WL 29258544; Mike Trickey & Norma Greenaway, Canadian Business
Leaders Push for Security Perimeter Zone, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 1, 2001, at DI.
183 Krikorian & Camarota, supra note 73, at A19.
184 After the September 11 th attacks, the U.S. government reviewed dropping six of
the twenty-nine countries-Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and
Uruguay-from the visa waiver program on the grounds that they "have problems
ranging from economic crises to passport fraud and theft." Mike Allen & Eric Pianin,
Bush Seeks Tighter Rules on Entry: Plan Would Track Students, Step Up Efforts to
Deport Suspects, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2001, at Al, 2001 WL 29758353. Because
terrorists with access to scanners and computer software may be able to exploit the visa
waiver system in any country, the program should be eliminated altogether in the
interests of both fairness and security. Jordan & Sullivan, supra note 128, at A4.
185 It has been suggested that a thirty-day wait be imposed on all visa applications to
allow adequate time for background checks and a computerized entry and exit control
tracking system to operate. Julia Malone, Easing Immigration No Longer an Option:
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Such a perimeter strategy would require the United States to
coordinate immigration policymaking with Canada and Mexico.
President Vicente Fox of Mexico has already expressed a desire to
work with the United States on such a strategy,1 86 but Canadian
officials have expressed the view that such an approach would
threaten Canada's sovereignty.187 Canada's opposition does not
present an insurmountable obstacle, especially if the case is made,
as some Canadian business leaders have done, on the grounds of
enlightened self-interest, both in terms of enhanced security and
economic competitiveness in the highly integrated world
economy. 188
B. Amnesty Program
Rather than summarily rounding up and deporting
undocumented immigrants currently residing and working in the
United States, as the U.S. government is currently doing
selectively, the United States should seriously reconsider
implementing a more just and efficient amnesty program. 189 As
the previously described enforcement actions confirm, most of the
undocumented immigrants do not pose a threat to national
security; also, they play a pivotal role in the U.S. economy,' 90
contributing as much as $440 billion a year to the nation's gross
domestic product.' 91
In addition to affirming their enormous contributions to U.S.
economic growth and prosperity, an amnesty program for the
nation's undocumented population would signal to the rest of the
world that the United States values diversity, which constitutes a
form of enlightened self-interest in the highly competitive
"Tectonic Shift in Public Mood," ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 5, 2001, at AlO.
186 Edward Hegstrom, Immigration Rights Now Take a Back Seat, Hous. CHRON.,
Oct. 10, 2001, at Al, 2001 WL 23634967; Edward Sifuentes, Fox to Continue Talks on
Immigration with U.S., N. COUNTY TIMES (California), Oct. 4, 2001,
http://www.nctimes.com/news/2001/20011004/61038.html.
187 Freedberg & Hendrix, supra note 182, at Al.
188 Trickey & Greenaway, supra note 182, at Dl.
189 Eduardo Porter, Aftermath: Investigation and Mobilization: Immigration
Advocates Rework Their Arguments on Legalization, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2001, at A9.
190 See Walker, supra note 56, at B6.
191 Julia Malone, Immigration's Value Still Hotly in Debate, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Sept. 9, 2001, at 19A, 2001 WL 3689809.
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international marketplace.192  Moreover, as Porter argues,
"legalizing undocumented immigrants would actually boost
national security."193
To qualify for amnesty, undocumented immigrants would have
to undergo a rigorous background check similar to the one
recommended above for foreigners applying for temporary or
permanent entry through U.S. embassies and consulate offices
around the world. Those judged eligible for amnesty would also
receive a tamper-proof identification card containing important
biometric data. Once such a system is in place, the U.S.
government should enforce workplace recruitment and hiring
policies by penalizing employers who continue to recruit and hire
undocumented workers.
As part of the amnesty program, it should be stipulated that
aliens and their children are entitled to the full range of public
support available to other U.S. citizens, especially in-state tuition
for college. 194 For the nation, investing in higher education would
constitute another expression of enlightened self-interest, as a
college education will enable our newest citizens and their
children to get better jobs, which, in turn, will generate income tax
revenue and financial support for our ailing social security
system. 19
5
C. National Identity Card
The perimeter security strategy outlined above should be
anchored in a technology-based system of screening and
monitoring the internal movement of people and products within
192 Johnson, Jr., supra note 151, at 6-18.
193 Porter, supra note 189, at A9.
194 See Jill Leovy, Tuition Law Praised, Attacked; Reaction: Giving Undocumented
Students a Break On College Is Backed By Educators But Opposed By An Immigration
Reform Group, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at B10. This would be a very different take
on things than previous immigration reforms like California Proposition 187, the Illegal
Immigrant Responsibility and Immigration Reform Act of 1996, and the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, discussed supra in
notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
195 Russell Contreras, Some Illegal Immigrants Get to Pay In-State Tuition at State
Colleges-Charging Lower Resident Fee Could Entice More to Attend; Opponents Say It
Flouts Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2001, at B1.
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North America. 196  As Thomas Friedman correctly points out,
technology cannot solve all of our security problems,' 97 but there
are promising innovations in biometric and electronic surveillance,
which can substantially reduce the threat of future terrorist attacks
without violating civil liberties or significantly reducing the timely
flow of people internationally. 98
Despite concerns about invasion of privacy, this homeland
defense strategy calls for a national identity card containing
essential biometric data similar to the one recommended for entry
into the country. Recognizing the potential for enhancing
homeland security, public opinion polls indicate that support for a
national identification card is growing.' 99 In addition to critical
biometric data that could eliminate the problem of racial profiling,
the computer chip in the card could be updated periodically with
critical information on personal consumer behavior, which could
be used to facilitate movement and commercial transactions. For
example, the identification. card could contain information on
business travelers and other frequent flyers, which would allow
such individuals to move swiftly through airport security
domestically and internationally.2 °°
D. A More Inclusive Capitalism
Finally, as a core component of the homeland defense strategy,
the U.S. government must take a leadership role in eliminating the
persistent poverty that plagues nearly four billion people in
196 See John Tierney, For Air Safety, An E-Z Pass Using Retinas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 2001, at DI.
197 Thomas L. Friedman, Naked Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001, at A29.
198 See Bob Keefe, Security: 'Smart' ID Could Aid Travelers at Airports, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Oct. 10, 2001, at A7, available at http://www.accessatlanta.com/
ajc/terrorism/air_travell100smartcard.html; John D. Woodward Jr., High-Tech Human
Identification Can Fight Terrorism: There is no Foolproof Solution, But Biometrics
Could Become a Powerful Way to Maintain Security, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept.
24, 2001, at A13, 2001 WL 22230006.
199 Brazaitis, supra note 144, at A9.
200 Kitty Bean Yancey, Passengers Uneasy with Pat-Downs, USA TODAY, Dec. 14-
16, 2001, at IA. Similar technologies-dubbed intelligent agents-have been developed
to protect, monitor, and facilitate the movement of cargo shipments from their
international points of origin through North American airports and seaports to their
ultimate destinations in a timely, efficient, and safe manner. Id.
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developing countries around the world.20 ' This should be a core
component of our efforts, not because poverty is a root cause of
terrorism, but rather because extreme conditions of economic
deprivation serve as breeding grounds for terrorism-ideal
environments for extremists of various persuasions to recruit new
members and to establish new cells for their organizations. If the
economic gap between the "haves" in the West and the "have-
nots" in the rest of the world continues to widen, anti-American
sentiment will continue to increase, and so will the spread of
terrorist groups that are capable of a mass assault on our nation
and its citizens from multiple points around the globe.
As a core component of the Administration's counter-terrorism
plan, President Bush and his top aides have argued that the United
States must have "enhanced trading powers to open markets
around the world as an antidote to terrorism. ' 20 2  More
specifically, in lobbying the U.S. Congress for trade negotiation
authority, U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick has
argued that "the war against terrorism hinges on building
coalitions, and . . . coalitions in the modem world are built on
trade first and ideology second., 20 3
Research shows, however, that trade agreements such as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 2° and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 25  have created
enormous inequality at home and especially abroad in emerging
market countries, which in turn has fueled the anti-globalization
movement.20 6 The findings of this research raise serious questions
201 Bartlett et al., supra note 11, at 20; see Prahalad & Hart, supra note 11, at 1-14.
202 Joseph Kahn, $25 Billion to Aid the Jobless is Backed by House G.O.P. Leaders,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at A22.
203 Sanger, supra note 169, at A22.
204 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, 194, modified and expanded by Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Dec. 8,
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3501 and
other sections (2001)).
205 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289 (chs. 1-9); 32 I.L.M. 605 (chs. 10-22); see also North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Dec. 8, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3301 and other sections (2001)).
206 See Micklethwait & Woolridge, supra note 10, at A14; Weller & Hersh, supra
note 10, at A13; Goozner, supra note 10, at A7; Weisbrot, supra note 10, at A10; Faux,
supra note 10, at A22.
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about the utility of the Bush Administration's strategy of pursuing
free trade as an antidote to terrorism.
Rather than an emphasis on free trade, the United States
should strive to reduce the growing gap between the haves and the
have-nots on a worldwide basis by developing a more inclusive
model of global capitalism. 2 7 Building upon the concept of civic
entrepreneurship,0 8 this new model should strive to develop win-
win strategic alliances between transnational corporations and
emerging national market governmental and nongovernmental
organizations that create sustainable income-generating
opportunities for the four billion poor people in the world.0 9
Proponents of a more inclusive capitalism have identified a
number of successful mutually beneficial, business-oriented
models of sustainable development that are currently being
pursued in emerging market countries.210  Depending on the
political and cultural context, evidence suggests that these
strategic alliances can be developed at various geographic scales,
ranging from the national level down to the local community or
village level. These more inclusive models of capitalism often
rely on disruptive technologies to create income-generating
opportunities for the poor.211 As such, they hold enormous
potential to reduce inequality and opposition to globalization "as
we know it" and to stem the tide of legal, and especially illegal,
immigration by creating local economic opportunities, which will
reduce the need and desire to relocate.212
207 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalism's Discontents, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, at
A16, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/1/stiglitz-j.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation); Amartya Sen,
How to Judge Globalism, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, at A2, available at
http://www.prospect.org/print/V 13/l/sen-a.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation); Susan Sechler, Starved for Attention,
AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, at A29, available at http://www.prospect.org/
print/V13/l/sechler-s.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation); Goozner, supra note 10, at A7; Bartlett et al., supra note
11, at 20; Prahalad & Hart, supra note 11, at 1-14.
208 Johnson, Jr., supra note 151, at 6-18.
209 Prahalad & Hart, supra note 11, at 2.
210 Id. at 1-14.
211 Id. at 11-14.
212 See id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Combined with ongoing efforts and proposals to protect our
communications infrastructure, nuclear power plants, chemical
plants, oil refineries, and other potential targets of terrorism, 213 I
am convinced that the foregoing four-fold strategy will enhance
homeland security without significantly encumbering the free flow
of people, products, and information.
213 See Robert Pear, Before Adjournment, Congress Acts on Bioterrorism and
Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2001, at B4; William Armbruster, Limits to Security: Air-
Cargo Professionals Agree that Tighter Rules Can Reduce Terrorist Threats But Can't
Eliminate Them, J. OF COM.-JoC WEEK, Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 2001, at 15; William
Armbruster, ID for 'Known Shippers'; Database Could Ease Security Burden for Air-
Cargo Shippers, J. OF COM.-JOC WEEK, Oct. 15-21, 2001, at 24; Michael Moss, U.S.
Airport Task Starts with Staff, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at Al; Al Baker & John
Sullivan, Port of Entry Now Means Point of Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at B1;
Simon Romero, Attacks at Hubs Could Disrupt Phone Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001,
at B5; Gary Stoller, Could Nuclear Plants Be Terrorists' Next Target?, USA TODAY,
Dec. 14-16, 2001, at lB.
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